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During congressional hearings on the Futures Trading Act of 1982,1
representatives of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
testified that some 1000 brokers operated in the United States in a
regulatory no man's land.2 The CFTC had long permitted these brokers,
primarily smaller firms or individuals unable or unwilling to become sub-
jected to government regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act
* J.D., Wayne State University (1972);, B.A., University of Michigan (1969). Mr. Horwitz
is Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc.
** J.D., Harvard University (1981); M.A. University of Pennsylvania, B.A., University
of Pennsylvania (1978). Mr. Gilberg is associated with the firm of Rogers & Wells, New
York, New York (Washington, D.C. office).
The authors wish to acknowledge the substantial assistance of Carol Feder, (J.D. Can-
didate, Columbia University (1983)), in the preparation of this article.
' Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983). The Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion operates under a unique sunset provision in the Commodity Exchange Act, which re-
quires Congress expressly to reauthorize the CFTC every four years. See Horwitz and
Markham, "Sunset" on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Scene II, Bus. LAW.
(1983). The CFTC, which was established under the CFTC Act of 1974, underwent its first
reauthorization process in 1978. See H.R. REP. No. 1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. REP.
No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2087; Hearings
Before the Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Resqarch and GeneralLegislation of the Com-
mittee on Agriculture, Research and Forestry on Reauthorization of the CFTC, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978); Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on Conservation and Credit of the
Committee on Agriculture to Extend Commodity Exchange Act, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
See generally Bor, Some Issues Arising in Consideration of the Futures Act of 1978, 34 REC.
A.B. CITY N.Y. 278 (1979); Gaine, The 1978 Sunset Review of the CFTC: Analysis and Com-
ments, 34 REC. A.B. Ciy N.Y. 290 (1979); Schneider and Santo, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission: A Review of the 1978 Legislation, 34 Bus. LAW. 1755 (1979).
2 S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1982) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
As of March 18, 1982, one year prior to the reauthorization hearings, 843 such brokers
operated, 15% of whom registered as associated persons, 45% of whom registered with
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(CEA),3 to operate as the designated "agents" of futures commission mer-
chants (FCMs). The CEA, however, did not require these brokers to
register in any capacity and the regulations did not subject these brokers
to any substantive regulations or exchange supervision. To codify this
existing practice, foster the development of these brokers, and resolve
many of the uncertainties surrounding their status and relationships with
FCMs, Congress in 1982 established a new category of registered com-
modity professionals, "introducing brokers", which provides the CFTC
with regulatory authority over such brokers.
This article will first discuss the treatment of agents under the CEA
prior to the new law, and the bases for the longstanding practice under
which these agents operated. The article will then analyze the 1982 legisla-
tion, and the analogous regulation of introducing brokers under the federal
securities laws. Finally, this will be contrasted with the CFTC's recently
adopted regulations for introducing brokers.
II. DESIGNATION OF AGENTS UNDER THE
COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
A. Registration and Regulation of Futures Commission Merchants
The CEA establishes several categories of registration for commodity
professionals, each category imposing a separate set of regulatory re-
quirements. Principal among these is the futures commission merchant
category. FCMs are the commodities analogue of securities broker-dealers,
encompassing all major commodity brokerage firms in the United States,
and including those individuals or entities engaged in the solicitation, ac-
ceptance and carrying of customer funds.4 Futures commission merchants
are also responsible for the clearing and execution of customer orders,
and are involved, in some capacity, in the vast majority of all transac-
tions in commodity futures contracts.'
the CFTC in some other capacity, and 55% of whom were not registered. Hearings on S.
2109 Before the Subcomm. on Agricultural Research and General Legislation of the Senate
Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings]; see infra notes 20-23 (associated persons). See generally Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Conservation, Credit, and Rural Development of the House Comm.
on Agricultural on H.R. 5447, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1982) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings]; H.R. REP. No. 565, Part I, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49, 133 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as HOUSE REPORT]; H.R. REP. No. 964, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as CONFERENCE REPORT].
1 7 U.S.C.A. S 6d (West Supp. 1983). See generally CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY
TRADING MANUAL, 8 (1982) (explanation of nature and role of futures commission merchants);
I P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION, SS 1.33-1.41 (1982).
1 See JOHNSON supra, note 4 at SS 1.33. The Commodity Exchange Act sets out regis-
tration and regulatory provisions concerning commodity trading advisers and commodity
pool operators. See 7 U.S.C.A. SS 2(a)(1), 6m (West Supp. 1983). Additionally, the CFTC has
established separate regulations governing disclosure, reporting and other requirements
for these categories of commodity professionals. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.1-4.41 (1982); see also
JOHNSON. supra note 4, at §S 1.53-1.64; Mitchell, The Regulation of Commodity Trading Ad-
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As a result of this central role, the CEA and CFTC regulations impose
upon FCMs, in addition to registration requirements, a host of extensive
and often burdensome regulatory requirements that govern virtually every
aspect of their business activities.' The CEA, for example, requires futures
commission merchants to maintain detailed books and records of all tran-
sactions and positions entered into or carried for their own or customers'
accounts. 7 FCMs must keep such records for a minimum of five years,
in a form specified by the CFTC and these records must be readily
available to the CFTC or to the United States Department of Justice
In addition, FCMs must maintain daily records of all transactions executed.'
Regulations also require futures commission merchants to supply
customers with a "Risk Disclosure Statement" and to receive a signed
attestation from these customers, prior to the opening of an account, that
the customers have received and read the statement." In addition, FCM's
must comply with continuous reporting and disclosure requirements, and
must constantly update their CFTC filings." Moreover, CFTC regulations
mandate that FCMs provide customers with monthly statements of the
status of the customers' accounts, and with copies of confirmation tickets
for executed orders.
2
visors, 27 EMORY L.J. 956 (1978). In addition, separate registration provisions exist for as-
sociated persons. See infra notes 21-23.
6 See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1), 6m (West Supp. 1983); 17 C.F.R. S 4.1-4.41 (1982); see also,
N.Y.L.J. Seminar, Comnodity Regulation 1978, 419-525 (1978).
7 7 U.S.C.A. S 6g (1980 & West Supp. 1983).
8 17 C.F.R. S 1.31 (1982).
' 7 U.S.C.A. § 6g(3) (West Supp. 1983); see JOHNSON, supra note 4, at S 1.38. The regula-
tions require futures commission merchants to file daily reports with the CFTC on each
account carried by it that holds or controls open futures positions above a reportable amount.
17 C.F.R. § 15.03 (1982). These large trader reporting requirements are separate from the
CFTC's speculative position limits. 7 U.S.C.A. S 6a (1980 & West Supp. 1983).
0 17 C.F.R. S 1.55 (1982). The text of the Risk Disclosure Statement includes explicit
warnings concerning the risks of speculative and margin trading. Failure to provide the
statement can give rise to a private action by the customer against the broker, if it can
be demonstrated that the customer was injured thereby. See, e.g., Abeyta v. Baar, Stearns
& Co., [1980-82 Transfer Binder] COMm. FuT. L. REP..(OCH) 21,350 (1982); Sher v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 11980-82 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,486 (1982).
1 17 C.F.R. § 1.32-1.37, 15.00-15.05, 21.00-21.02 (1982); see JOHNSON, supra note 4, at
1.38. In addition to the large trader reports required of futures commission merchants,
the CFTC may issue special calls concerning customer accounts carried by futures commis-
sion merchants or the identity of those exercising trading authority over such accounts.
17 C.F.R. Part 21 (1982).
" 17 C.F.R. § 1.33 (1982). The purpose of the regulation requiring monthly statements
of customer accounts is to assure that customers are kept apprised of the status of their
accounts. As a result, a customer receiving monthly account statements may be charged
with notice of the statement's contents and, therefore, held to be estopped from raising
untimely protests concerning the trading conducted for the account. See, e.g., Anderholdt
v. Rosenthal & Co., [1980-82 Transfer Binder] CoMm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,218 (1981). In
contrast, a failure to provide account statements not only preserves the customer's right
to protest the handling of the account, but may in itself give rise to an action against the
broker. See Smith v. Comvest, [1980-82 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,306
(1978).
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The most extensive requirements imposed upon FCM's, however, are
the segregation and net capital rules."3 The former requires that futures
commission merchants maintain all funds of a customer in a separate ac-
count and that FCMs treat and deal with these funds as belonging to the
customer. 4 In addition, the FCMs use or investment of such funds is
restricted." The net capital, or minimum financial regulations require
futures commission merchants to maintain a specified dollar amount of
liquid assets."6 Moreover, the actual net capital balance required is substan-
tial, thereby preventing those brokers without sizable assets from registra-
tion as FCMs.Y
B. The Role of Agents in the Commodities Industry
The burden and expense of futures commission merchant registra-
tion rendered it impracticable, if not impossible, for many smaller brokers
to register in that capacity. 8 The cost and staffing required for compliance
with the numerous recordkeeping requirements could in themselves be
prohibitive. The most significant barrier, however, was the net capital
requirement, which in effect prohibited smaller firms from registration
and operation as futures commission merchants. These firms, often with
only a few employees, or even operating as individuals, with a limited
number of customers, simply could not comply with minimum financial
requirements as high as $50,000 to $100,000.11
At the same time, it was often infeasible for these brokers to register
7 U.S.C.A. 55 6d(2), 6f(2) (West Supp. 1983); 17 C.F.R. §5 1.17, 1.0-1.27 (1982).
', 17 C.F.R. 5 1.20 (1982). In addition to the segregation and net capital rules, the regula-
tions set out other specific requirements concerning the handling of customers' funds.
11 Id. 5 1.25 (1982). In general, a futures commission merchant may invest customer
funds only in obligations of the federal or state governments. Id Moreover, even with respect
to these investments, the use of the funds must be identified clearly with the customer
to whom they belong and detailed records must be kept. Id. SS 1.26-127 (1982). In addition,
the futures commission merchant must compute daily the amount of money, securities and
property that must be segregated in order to comply with the Act. Id. 5 1.32 (1982).
18 Id. S 1.17 (1982). Section 4f(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C.A. SS 6f(2) actually requires only
that contract markets adopt minimum financial requirements for futures commission mer-
chants, subject to CFTC approval. See 7 U.S.C.A. S 6f(2) (West Supp. 1983). In 1978, however,
the CFTC adopted a new regulation, 17 C.F.R. S 1.52, which mandated that contract markets
adopt net capital rules at least as stringent as, if not more so than, CFTC standards. Because
the CFTC retains exclusive authority under the regulations to grant extensions of time
or waivers on net capital requirements the minimum financial regulations in effect became
fully centralized. See 17 C.F.R. S 1.17(g) (1982); JOHNSON, supra note 4, at SS 2A8,3A9. Regula-
tions also require futures commission merchants to maintain detailed records on, and ob-
tain regulatory approval for, their treatment of assets and liabilities for purposes of the com-
plex net capital computations. 17 C.F.R. 5 1.17(h) (1982).
17 C.F.R. 5 1.17 (1982). The net capital requirements imposed upon broker-dealers
under the federal securities laws are not as strict. See infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
18 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 5, 273, 597.
,9 17 C.F.R. S 1.17 (1982). The difference in net capital treatment depends on whether
the FCM is a member of the National Futures Association. See infra note 153.
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as "associated persons" of futures commission merchants. Associated per-
sons are registered representatives of a futures commission merchant,
engaged in the solicitation and acceptance of customer funds on a FCM's
behalf." Because associated persons are under the FCM's supervision,
associated persons are subject to reduced regulatory requirements.2'
Although some FCMs employed and sponsored smaller brokers as asso-
ciated persons, many were unwilling or unable to undertake the respon-
sibility of supervising the operations of an independent firm over which
it might exercise little control.22 In addition, associated persons can act
in that capacity for only one registered FCM.n This restriction further
limited the ability of independent firms to register as associated persons
since the firms would not be permitted to deal freely with clearing brokers.
As a result, most smaller brokerage firms could not associate with a
registered FCM. The small, independent brokerage firms, not quite
employees and not quite futures commission merchants, operated,
therefore, in a regulatory vacuum.
These brokers, however, played a significant role in the commodities
industry, introducing the accounts of many traders to registered futures
commission merchants. Because many of these traders might be reluc-
tant to deal directly with a futures commission merchant, or might be
unaware of the means of doing so, these agents often provided traders
with the only means of trading on the commodities exchanges.24 The
customer thus could open an account with an independent broker, who
would transmit all funds and orders to a futures commission merchant
with whom the broker had a correspondent relationship." This resulted
in significantly expanding the opportunity for traders and unregistered
1 7 U.S.C.A. S 6k (West Supp. 1983). Associated persons, alternatively labelled as ac-
count executives, registered representatives or as part of some other category, are the
sales staffs of many futures commission merchants. As such, they are extensively screened
before being hired and generally are trained rigorously before beginning their sales opera-
tions. See JOHNSON, supra note 4, S 1.43. Associated persons of those futures commission mer-
chants who are members of contract markets must become registered not only with the
CFTC but also with that contract market, to accept orders thereon. Id. Registration of
associated persons, as in the case of other registered commodity professionals is accomplished
under procedures prescribed by CFTC regulation. 17 C.F.R. S 3.12 (1982).
" See JOHNSON, supra note 4, § 1.44,1.46. Associated persons, for example, are not sub-
ject to minimum financial requirements nor to any significant recordkeeping or reporting
obligations. Id Instead, the futures commission merchant's compliance with the regulations
suffices for its associated persons as well.
' Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 219-20, 597-98.
n3 17 C.F.R. S 3.12(f) (1982). The CFTC's regulations governing those categories of
registration created by the 1982 legislation allow associated persons to be affiliated with
no more than one FCM or introducing broker, although the regulations may establish multiple
associations with commodity trading advisors or commodity pool operators. See 48 Fed.
Reg. 35248, 35255 (August 3, 1983). Up to the present, regulations prohibited only futures
commission merchants or agents employed by associated persons, and dual affiliations.
" Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 597.
' House Hearings, supra note 2, at 568; 48 Fed. Reg. 14933, 14935 (April 6, 1983).
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brokers to trade on the futures markets, additional overall market liquidity,
and increased markets for the clearing futures commission merchants.
In fact, these "introducing brokers" existed for many years in the
commodities industry, primarily in three forms: the country grain
elevators, the small commodity "store front" operations, and securities
broker-dealers handling futures business. Each of these entities initially
entered the industry in order to service customers who might otherwise
not engage in futures trading, and only gradually developed a more
substantial involvement.
The principle function of country grain elevators, for example, is the
storage and reselling of crops on behalf of farmers. In addition to pro-
viding these services, elevator operators also served as advisors to farmers
regarding their futures transactions and, over the years, many such
operators established relationships with FCMs. Through such relation-
ships, operators entered futures orders for farmers and received a por-
tion of the FCMs' commissions. In effect, the operators became agents
of the FCMs. Many FCMs developed substantial client bases through these
arrangements, establishing close relationships with the country grain
elevators and taking responsibility for their futures activities.
The second category of introducing brokers includes the small, local
firms acting as independent entities, who cleared customer transactions
through one of the major FCMs. The customer's relationship was therefore
with the introducing broker, although the research, clearing facilities and
customer statements came from the clearing FCM.
The third form of introduced relationship was that between regional
securities broker-dealers and registered FCMs." Many of these broker-
dealers were registered securities introducing brokers who, in order to
allow their clients to engage in futures trading, entered into introduced
relationships with the futures arm of a securities clearing firm. The broker-
dealer preferred to introduce this business on a fully disclosed basis
through the clearing firm, rather than become an FCM or exchange clear-
ing member.
FCMs were often willing to enter into these introduced relationships,
despite the fact that they were thereby required to deal with potential
competitors, to utilize more fully their trade processing and order execu-
tion facilities. Clearing memberships on commodity exchanges are expen-
sive and require substantial capital on the part of the clearing firm to
maintain these operations. The handling of additional business through
2 See Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 78; see also House Hearings, supra note 2, at
82. The CFTC asserted during the 1982 reauthorization hearings that some ten percent
of those firms or individuals operating as designated agents registered as introducing brokers
under the securities laws. See Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 78; see also House Hearings,
supra note 2, at 82. This, of course, subjected these agents to regulation by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The CFTC's regulations for introducing brokers provide that
compliance with certain regulatory requirements under the securities laws would satisfy
CFTC regulations as well. 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35263 (August 3, 1983).
[Vol. 40:907
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an introduced relationship permitted the clearing firm to achieve greater
productivity from its resources without additional capital expenditures.
The benefits conferred by these arrangements on FCMs, small traders
and others, as well the simultaneous inability on smaller brokerage firms
to register as futures commission merchants, led to the establishment of
a policy on the part of the federal regulatory authorities not only to allow
but to promote the existence of these agents and their correspondent rela-
tionships with futures commission merchants. Long before the establish-
ment of the CFTC, the CFTC's predecessor, the Commodity Exchange
Authority," exempted these brokers from registration and many of the
regulatory requirements imposed upon futures commission merchants.28
Known as 1.31a brokers, due to the provision of the regulations that per-
mitted these brokers to operate, these brokers solicited orders and in-
troduced customer accounts to registered FCMs on a fully disclosed basis
without being subject to minimum financial or segregation requirements.'
The CFTC, subsequent to its creation in 1974, followed this practice
although the practice still was not codified. The CFTC permitted these
smaller brokers to operate as designated agents of FCMs without being
registered. 0 This practice allowed the smaller brokers to function as in-
dependent entities under the brokers' own names in soliciting customer
funds and orders. The CFTC required only that FCMs list on their registra-
tions the identities of all agents soliciting customer accounts on their behalf
and of all agents for whom FCMs cleared customer transactions." In ad-
dition, the agents' employees could register as associated persons and
would be required to identify the brokers who employed them.'
See Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No . 49 Stat. 149 (1936). Congress estab-
lished the Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA) pursuant to the Commodity Exchange
Act of 1936, and the CEA operated as a unit of the United States Department of Agriculture
from 1936 to 1974, at which time it was replaced by the CFTC. See CFTC, Annual Report,
1976, at 23-34 (1976).
1 See 36 Fed. Reg. 22810-11 (December 1, 1971). The Commodity Exchange Authority
noted that the brokers transmit customers' commodity futures orders to other futures com-
mission merchants for execution while futures commission merchants render confirmations
and statements of purchase and sale, and transmit remittance, direct to such customers. Id.
The apparent practice at the time was to refer to 1.31a brokers as "futures commission
merchants" as well, despite the fact that they were not required to register in that
capacity. 36 Fed. Reg. 18000 (Sept. 8, 1971); see 20 Fed. Reg. 5829 (August 11, 1955) (amen-
ding certain recordkeeping requirements); 33 Fed. Reg. 17632 (November 26, 1968) (amen-
ding minimum financial requirements); 34 Fed. Reg. 600 (January 16, 1969).
1 See 13 Fed. Reg. 7820 (December 18, 1948). Section 1.31a provided that a 1.31a broker
shall have complied with the regulatory requirements if the books and records described
in the regulations are prepared and kept according to such regulations by either the futures
commission merchant transmitting customers' commodity futures orders or by the futures
commission merchant to whom such orders are transmitted. Id.
SId.
See 48 Fed. Reg. 14933 (April 6, 1983); House Hearings, supra note 2, at 567.
See CFTC Form 8-R, Comm FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 3521. CFTC form 8-R will be revised
in the near future, in accordance with regulations implementing introducing broker registra-
tion and making changes in associated person registration. See 48 Fed. Reg. 14933 (April
6, 1983).
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The CFTC also permitted unregistered foreign brokers to introduce
accounts to futures commission merchants for clearing and execution of
orders on United States contract markets.- In 1980, the CFTC adopted
a regulation which specifically authorized this practice, but stated that
the clearing futures commission merchant would be deemed the agent
of the foreign broker and its customers for purposes of regulatory com-
pliance and service of process.'
Under the CFTC's practice, agents referred customer accounts to
FCMs on a fully disclosed basis. The FCM provided back office services
for the agent's accounts and was reponsible for compliance with minimum
financial, segregation, reporting and recordkeeping requirements.' The
futures commission merchant also was responsible for providing the
customer with confirmations and monthly statements.6 Because the agent
did not carry customer funds or accounts, the futures commission mer-
chant's regulatory compliance satisfied the agent's obligations as well. For
introducing the account to the futures commission merchant, the agent
received a percentage of the commissions charged to the customer by the
futures commission merchant for the clearing and execution of orders.'
This CFTC policy, although never explicitly articulated, was based
at least in part upon section 4f(1) of the Act, which required applicants
for registration as futures commission merchants to include on their ap-
plication the names and addresses of all agents engaged in the solicita-
tion or acceptance of customer funds on behalf of the futures commission
merchant.," Similarly, section 4k of the Act made it unlawful for any per-
son to associate with any futures commission merchant or with any agent
of a futures commission merchant in any capacity that involves the solicita-
tion or acceptance of customers' orders or the supervision of any person
or persons so engaged, unless such person registered with the CFTC as
See 17 C.F.R. S 15.05 (1982).
Id. The futures commission merchant is required to notify foreign brokers and their
customers of this regulation. Id. S 15.05(c) (1982). The futures commission merchant is not
deemed to be the agent of the foreign broker if the latter or its customers executes a writ-
ten agreement with a person domiciled in the United States to act as their agent for pur-
poses of receiving delivery of CFTC communications. In promulgating the regulation, the
CFTC noted that the regulation was necessary because of the CFTC's frequent inability
to communicate directly and in a timely manner with foreign brokers. See 45 Fed. Reg.
30426 (May 8, 1980).
11 See 48 Fed. Reg. 14933 (April 6, 1983). Under the CFTC's proposed regulations, in-
troducing brokers will be required to refrain from engaging in any back office functions
such as the processing of customer orders or the segregation of funds. Introducing brokers,
unlike agents, will also be subject to minimum financial, reporting and recordkeeping re-
quirements. 48 Fed. Reg. 35248 (August 3, 1983).
3 Id.; see also 13 Fed. Reg. 7820, 7839 (Dec. 18, 1948).
See 48 Fed. Reg. 14933 (April 6, 1983).
7 U.S.C.A. S 6f(1) (West Supp. 1983); SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 40. In fact, the
Commodity Exchange Act has contained such a provision since its original enactment. See
Pub. L. No. 74-675, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936).
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an associated person.' Neither of these provisions, however, required the
agents of a futures commission merchant to register as FCMs or associated
persons. As a result, the CFTC was provided implicit, if not express,
statutory authority for its practice of agent designation.
C. Liability for Agent Misconduct
The most significant problem posed by this arrangement was that in
the absence of registration, the CFTC and its predecessor, the Commodity
Exchange Authority, lacked the direct regulatory control over these
brokers that would have allowed them to monitor the brokers' activities,
investigate their conduct or, in many instances, even establish their
identities.4 0 The CFTC did have some indirect authority over agents
through the requirement that FCMs list their identities,4' but the CFTC
imposed no substantive regulations. These agents, however, had the op-
portunity to, and often did, engage in fraudulent conduct such as improper
solicitations and misappropriation of funds.4"
Moreover, the attenuated nature of the relationship rendered it dif-
ficult for the CFTC to hold the FCM liable for the agent's misconduct.
For this reason, the Commodity Exchange Authority revoked the express
regulatory provision for 1.31a brokers in 1971, expressing the concern,
later raised by the CFTC during the 1982 reauthorization hearings, that
the arrangement allowed futures commission merchants to avoid liability
for the acts of these brokers, thereby denying customers the opportunity
for relief for the mishandling of their accounts.43 Nevertheless, the CFTC
continued informally the practice of allowing operation of unregistered
agents despite the absence of an express regulatory provision.
A CFTC advisory committee, which addressed, among other things,
the use of agents by registered FCMs, voiced a similar concern in 1976.
The advisory committee concluded that because of the potential for miscon-
duct, introducing brokers should be required to register as associated per-
"7 .U.S.C.A. S 6k (West Supp. 1983); SENATE REPORT, supra, note 2, at 40. As noted,
the sales personnel employed by agents were subject to associated person registration,
even though the agents themselves were not required to register.
" See 48 Fed. Reg. 14938 (April 6, 1983).
"1 See supra note 36.
42 SENATE HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 77. Agents have the opportunity to commit the
same abuses as an associated person of the FCM. Id. An agent may convert customer funds,
fail to provide risk disclosure, provide false or misleading information to induce a customer
to trade and intentionally mishandle customer orders in a variety of ways. Id.
"See 36 Fed. Reg. 22810 (Dec. 1, 1971). The Commodity Exchange Authority noted
that most 1.31a brokers acted as agents on behalf of the merchants with whom they carry
the accounts. Id. The Authority further noted that these merchants often denied respon-
sibility for the acts of the 1.31a brokers and left customers without adequate relief. Id.
" Report of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Advisory Committee on Com-
modity Futures Trading Professionals, COMm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) No. 29, Part II (August 20,
1976), at 20.
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sons if the agents' compensation from the futures commission merchant
was based upon commission revenues generated by the account." The
CFTC, although acting on portions of the advisory committee's findings,
did not adopt this recommendation on agent registration."
The inability under the CEA to require registration of agents resulted
in efforts by the CFTC to impute their conduct to the futures commission
merchants through whom they cleared and executed transactions. The
CFTC's "regulation" of agents, therefore, essentially was premised upon
the secondary liability provisions of the CEA, based upon the theory of
a principal-agent relationship between introducing firms and futures com-
mission merchants.47 In particular, the CFTC came to rely upon the
respondeat superior provisions of section 2(a)(1) of the Act in imposing
liability upon futures commission merchants.5
Section 2(a)(1) essentially encompassed the common law of agency,
holding a principal liable to the same extent as the principal's agent for
the latter's acts committed within the scope of the agency. 9 Yet this form
of liability did not characterize accurately the futures commission mer-
chant/agent arrangement." Indeed, the term "agent" was a misnomer in
this context, since agents were independent entities who merely introduced
accounts. Futures commission merchants often had only the most tenuous
connection with their agents, and had little opportunity to control or super-
vise the agents' conduct.5 Under this arrangement, the FCM was in a
I5£d.
48 See id. Portions of the advisory committee's findings included, for example, adop-
tion of minimum financial requirements for futures commission mechants, and an express
duty of supervision. Id. at 12-13.
', See House Hearings, supra note 2, at 82; infra notes 57-65 (cases cited).
48 See 7 U.S.C. S 4 (1976). The section provides, in part, that the act, omission, or failure
of an agent acting for any association within the scope of his employment will be regarded
as the act, omission, or failure of the association. Id.; see Markham and Meltzer, Secondary
Liability Under the Commodity Exchange Act-Respondeat Superior, Aiding and Abetting,
Supervision and Scienter, 27 EMORY L.J. 1127 (1978) (review of application of 7 U.S.C. S 4 and
other secondary liability provisions under committee laws).
41 See, e.g., Markham and Meltzer, supra note 48.
1 See Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 222 (statement of Edmund Schroeder). The
Chairman of the American Bar Association's Committee on Commodities Regulation, Edmund
R. Schroeder, states that the problem with the CFTC's approach is that in many cases
introducing brokers are independent firms scattered across the country. Id.; see also id.
at 219, 542-43; House Hearings, supra note 2, at 545, 567-68.
' See Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 222-23. In the Senate Hearings Schroeder stated
that in most cases futures commission merchants cannot exercise great control over the
introducing brokers. Id. (statement of Edmund Schroeder, past President, Futures Industry
Association). Additionally, it was pointed out that the principal objection to S 2(a)(1)
was that it would place responsibility for an agent on the FCM when the FCM has only
limited control. Id. at 219 (statement of Howard A. Sottler); see also House Hearings, supra
note 2, at 545, 567-68 (statement of Conticommodity Services, Inc.); id. at 545 (statement
of Edmund R. Schroeder).
Introducing brokers are, in reality, independent brokers who solicit and accept orders
for their own customers, and who merely utilize the services of an FCM for clearing, record-
keeping and funds safekeeping. House Hearings, supra note 2, at 568.
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sense the agent of the introducing firm, simply clearing transactions for
the latter's customers.
Section 2(a)(1), however, allowed for imposition of liability simply on
the basis of an agency relationship. As a result, futures commission mer-
chants began to find themselves held strictly liable for the acts of agents
over whom they exercised little or no control and with whom they may
have had only a remote agency relationship. In Perkins v. First London
Commodity Ltd.,52 for example, the CFTC administrative law judge held
a commodity options firm liable for the acts of its agent, despite the fact
that the futures commission merchant never participated in the fraudulent
or wrongful conduct. In Perkins, the judge found that the agent had been
selling naked options and had appropriated customer funds. The CFTC
administrative law judge found that, even if the futures commission mer-
chant was not involved in the agent's fraud, it could be liable on the basis
of the agency relationship. Moreover, in McHaney v. Winchester-Hardin
Oppenheimer Trading Co.,' an administrative law judge held that a futures
commission merchant who clothed a branch office with apparent authority
may be liable under section 2(a)(1) if customers rely upon that authority
to the customers' detriment. The administrative law judge stated that
the question of whether the agent was operating as a branch office or
a separate entity must be viewed from the customers' point of view.-
In In re Big Red Commodity Corp.," an agent operating a branch of-
fice of a futures commission merchant and registered as its associated
person, engaged in a fraudulent course of conduct with respect to numerous
customers. The futures commission merchant argued that the associated
person status was merely for the convenience of the agent, that it had
no control or supervisory authority over the latter and that the branch
office was not a part of its business, since the futures commission mer-
chant merely cleared transactions for customers of the agent. The admin-
istrative law judge imposed liability under section 2(a)(1), however, despite
an explicit finding that the futures commission merchant had had no
knowledge of nor participation in the agent's fraud.
Similarly, in Nobel v. Williston Corp.,' a futures commission merchant
asserted that a branch office operated by an agent was in fact a separate
entity and that the FCM had terminated the relationship prior to the time
of the alleged fraud. The adminstrative law judge rejected this argument
based upon the judge's finding that the agent made fraudulent solicita-
tions before termination of the branch office. The judge held the futures
commission merchant liable for the agent's misrepresentations and for
his failure to provide a Risk Disclosure Statement, regardless of the fact
that the futures commission merchant was neither aware of nor involved
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in the fraud committed. The administrative law judge noted that a lack
of knowledge of an agent's activities does not immunize a principal from
liability for that agent's activities within the scope of his employment.
The- principal need not profit financially from the wrongful conduct of an
agent to have committed a violation. 7 In this context, however, the agent
was not an employee of the FCM, but actually an independent contractor,
underscoring the inappropriateness of relying upon section 2(a)(1) and the
scope of employment test in this situation.
In Anderholdt v. Rosenthal & Co.," the administative law judge found
that an agent who had engaged in unauthorized trading acted only as an
independent contractor of the FCM. Nevertheless, section 2(a)(1) imputed
the agent's activity to the FCM.59 Under this holding, the futures commis-
sion merchant could not have structured the relationship to avoid liability
for the agent's misconduct.
In the course of the 1982 reauthorization hearings, the CFTC submit-
ted data demonstrating the rapid proliferation of brokerage firms and in-
dividuals acting as agents." This information served to highlight that the
gap in the statute under which these agents operated needed to be filled.
The CFTC remained unable to hold agents directly responsible for their
own conduct, while the CFTC was holding FCMs strictly liable for the
actions of those they could not control. The need for some legislative
response, therefore, had become apparent.
III. ESTABLISHMENT OF INTRODUCING BROKER
REGISTRATION- THE FUTURES TRADING
ACT OF 1982
During the 1982 reauthorization process the CFTC, industry represen-
tatives and members of Congress all concluded that some form of statutory
codification of the agent designation practice was necessary. The CFTC
clearly required regulatory authority under which it could hold agents
accountable for their own conduct. Although disagreement existed about
the optimal means of accomplishing this goal, a general consensus existed
that to require agents to register as futures commission merchants
remained wholly impracticable. The burden and expense of such registra-
tion still constituted prohibitive barriers for these brokers.
Substantial disagreement existed, however, over the precise type of
regulatory scheme to be adopted. The CFTC proposed that Congress
amend the CEA to require agents to register as associated persons of
'" Id. at 25,119.
- Id. 21,218.
59 Id.
I See Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 77. In November, 1979, 630 designated agents
cleared transactions through registered futures commission merchants. By March, 1982,




an FCM 1 The basis for this position was the CFTC's contention that many
futures commission merchants had been relying upon agents in lieu of
hiring their own sales forces, while most futures commission merchants
conducted their sales efforts through branch offices, the sales staffs of
which were registered as associated persons.2 The CFTC therefore argued
that adoption of the CFTC proposal would bring about parity of respon-
sibility between those FCMs with their own employed sales forces
registered as associated persons, and those using unregistered agents. 3
Industry representatives argued, however, that this portrayal was
wrong, since valid and significant distinctions exist between a futures com-
mission merchant's use of associated persons of introducting brokers."
As noted, the latter merely uses the services of the FCM for the purpose
of clearing and executing transactions, and for recordkeeping and
regulatory compliance.65 In contrast, the term "associated person" means
that the FCM has some business connection with that person, which per-
mits it to exercise supervisory control. Many members of the industry,
61 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 40-41; House Hearings, supra. note 2, at 82, 122-23;
Senate Hearings, supra, note 2, at 306-07. As noted, the CFTC, as early as 1976, had con-
sidered adoption of such a proposal. See supra note 44.
" See House Hearings, supra note 2, at 122. Approximately ten percent of the futures
commission merchants registered with the Commission employ eighty percent of the agents
as selling arms of the firm. Id. (supplemental statement of Philip McB. Johnson); see also
SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 40.
CFTC premised its position in large part on the Commission's belief that "[a]gents
have the opportunity to commit the same abuses as an associated person of the futures
commission merchant. An agent may convert customer funds, fail to provide risk disclosure,
provide false or misleading information to induce a customer to trade and intentionally
mishandle customer orders in a variety of ways .. " Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at
77 (responses of Philip McB. Johnson to written questions).
" See House Hearings, supra note 2, at 120, 122. The Commission considered various
ways to protect the public from the abuses which occur as a result of FCM's denying respon-
sibility for the acts of introducing brokers. Id.
One approach to create a new and separate registration category for "agents"
(e.g., as "fully disclosed brokers") was considered. However, many of these "agents"
are individuals or very small businesses, and a separate regulatory structure could
prove to be too costly and burdensome for them. The Commission proposes in-
stead to create parity between those futures commission merchants using a branch
office system and those using "agents" by requiring the latter to register with
the Commission under the existing registration category of "associated persons"
(Section 4k(1) of the Act and Section 8(a) of the Bill). Thus, the futures commission
merchant would be responsible for its agents to the same extent as for its branch
offices. It should be noted that this proposal is entirely consistent with the ex-
isting provision of the Act which makes a principal liable for the acts and omis-
sions of its agents.
Id.
, House Hearings, supra note 2, at 543, 568; Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 219-20.
" See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 219, 222, 240-41, 543; House Hearings,
supra note 2, at 545, 567-68.
See House Hearings, supra note 2, at 568 (prepared statement of ContiCommodity
Services, Inc.). The prepared statement of ContiCommodity Services argued that agents are
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therefore, believed that adoption of the CFTC proposal would be worse
than the existing unregulated situation.1
7
Moreover, several members of the industry testified that adoption
of the CFTC proposal would actually force many if not all introducing
brokers out of business, thereby eliminating access to the commodities
markets on the part of smaller brokerage firms and traders. John J.
Conhenney, Chairman of Merrill Lynch Futures Inc., stated that unless
an introducing broker contractually surrenders its identity it is unlikely
that a futures commission merchant will permit registration of an agent
as an associated person to occur.68 Because adoption of the CFTC pro-
posal would require the introducing broker to register as an associated
person of the clearing FCM, and to be an associated person of only one
firm, the clearing firm would inevitably require the introducing broker
to place its operations within supervisory control of the clearing firm,
thus preventing the introducing broker from operating as an independent
entity. 9
The Committee on Commodities Regulation of the American Bar
Association (ABA), voicing industry concerns, proposed the creation of
a separate category of registration for introducing brokers.7 The ABA
argued that adoption of its proposal would be a more accurate reflection
of the relationships between industry members, since the introducing
broker is in reality neither an agent nor an associated person. The pro-
posal recommended that introducing brokers be subject to the same
general types of regulatory requirements as futures commission merchants,
although to a reduced extent. The ABA also advocated an exemption for
introducing brokers from the CFTC's reserve and segregation require-
ments, since introducing brokers do not handle customers' funds.7 1
independent brokers who solicit and accept orders for their own customers, and
who merely utilize the services of an FCM for clearing, recordkeeping, and funds
safekeeping. These independent brokers are in effect customers of the clearing
FCM, and frequently change from one clearing FCM to another just as a customer
might change from one broker to another. Under these circumstances the clear-
ing FCM does not and cannot effectively control the independent broker's activities,
and it would be unwarranted and misleading to use a registration category, such
as that proposed by the CFTC, which suggests otherwise.
Id.; see also supra note 50 & 51.
" See supra note 51. The registration of agents as associated persons would increase
the liability of the FCM and its principal officers and parties for the acts of people over
whom, as the way business is now conducted, the FCM and its managers have extremely
limited control. See House Hearings, supra note 2, at 82 (testimony of Howard A. Stottler).
" Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 598; see also House Hearings, supra note 2, at 82
(testimony of Howard A. Stottler).
" See House Hearings, supra note 2, at 82 (testimony of Howard A. Stottler).
70 See Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 542-43, 556, 560-61; House Hearings, supra note
2, at 544-45. The ABA proposal included a definition of "introducing broker" which Con-
gress ultimately adopted.
71 See Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 542-43, 556, 560-61; House Hearings, supra note
2, at 544-45. The CFTC, in adopting its regulations on introducing brokers, has exempted
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Members of Congress, however, as well as CFTC officials, countered
that an establishment of a separate registration category for introducing
brokers might have the effect of insulating a futures commission mer-
chant from liability for acts committed by its introducing brokers. 2 Con-
gressman Dan Glickman asserted that this would mean that the clearing
FCM could no longer be liable for the acts of the introducing broker, even
if the introducing broker committed such acts within the scope of the
agency relationship.73 Similarly, Philip McB. Johnson, Chairman of the
CFTC, testified that the introducing broker approach sought by the in-
dustry and the ABA would make introducing brokers independent con-
tractors.74 As a result, brokers would be liable for their own acts and no
liability could be imputed to the clearing futures commission merchant.
Johnson argued that the CFTC proposal to require registration of introduc-
ing brokers as associated persons would make the futures commission mer-
chant reponsible for the acts of such person if he were operating a branch
office of the futures commission merchant. 5
Nevertheless, both the House Committee on Agriculture and the
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutritution and Forestry accepted the
proposal advocated by the industry, and established the category of in-
troducing broker."8 The House and Senate bills, which were substantially
identical in this respect, went to a Conference Committee which adopted
the legislation as the Futures Trading Act of 1982. 7 President Reagan
signed the conference bill into law on January 11, 1983.78
The legislation amends section 2(a)(1) of the CEA to define the term
"introducing broker" as any person engaged in soliciting or accepting pur-
chase or sale orders for the future delivery of any commodity and who
does not accept money, securities, or property to secure contracts that
may result. The Act excepts individuals who register as associated per-
sons of a futures commission merchant.
79
The legislation also amends section 4(k)(1) of the CEA to require that
introducing brokers register with the CFTC." As a result, individuals or
entities operating as introducing brokers will have the option of register-
ing as associated persons of the FCM, or as independent introducing
brokers. The CFTC, however, is authorized to establish by regulation ex-
emptions from introducing broker registration, such as those which pres-
introducing brokers from the reserve and segregation requirements and imposed reduced
minimum financial requirements. 48 Fed. Reg. 35248 (August 3, 1983).
71 HousE REPORT, supra note 25, at 133.
11 Id.; see also House Hearings, supra note 2, at 85.
11 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 133; House Hearings, supra note 2, at 10.
75 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 133; House Hearings, supra note 2, at 10.
11 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 49; Senate Report, supra note 2, at 40-41.
" CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 50, at 40-41.
1 Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983).
7 U.S.C.A. S 4(a)(1) (West Supp. 1983).
7 U.S.C.A. S 6(k)(1) (West Supp. 1983).
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ently exist with respect to other registration categories. 1 In addition, the
legislation amends section 4(f) to authorize the CFTC to promulgate regula-
tions concerning financial and recordkeeping requirements for introducing
brokers.82 The Conference Committee contemplated that the Commission
would establish financial requirements that would enable introducing
brokers to remain economically viable. The Committee intended to require
that all persons dealing with the public register with the Commission,
but also intended to provide these registrants with substantial flexibility
on the manner and classification of registration.'
The legislation authorizes the CFTC not only to register introducing
brokers, and to establish regulatory standards for their operation, but
also to hold introducing brokers liable for their own misconduct. As the
Senate Committee noted, however, a number of existing legal theories
remain upon which the CFTC might hold a futures commission merchant
liable for the acts of an introducing broker, if the introducing broker is
operating as a de facto branch office of the futures commission merchant."
In establishing introducing broker registration, Congress codified the
existing practice of agent designation, rejecting the CFTC's proposal to
require registration of agents to register as associated persons. The com-
mittee reports highlight the independence of introducing brokers, the in-
advisibility of subjecting them to branch office status and the inability
of futures commission merchants adequately to supervise their activities.'
Moreover, Congress mandated that the CFTC assure that introducing
brokers remain economically viable and not subject to burdensome
regulatory requirements.86
IV. REGULATION OF INTRODUCING BROKERS UNDER THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The securities industry has followed a longstanding policy of relaxing
regulatory requirements for introducing brokers to allow them to do
business. In contrast to the commodities laws, however, which lacked a
coherent regulatory structure for such brokers prior to 1982, the federal
securities laws much earlier established a separate set of requirements
" See id. Section 4k() essentially incorporated introducing brokers into the existing
requirement of the sections with respect to futures commission merchants.
See 7 U.S.C.A. S 6f (West Supp. 1983).
8 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 41.
" SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 41.
1 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 41. The Senate Committee report noted that the
Committee adopted the introducing broker provision because a significant number of the
agents of futures commission merchants utilize the services of FCMs for clearing and record-
keeping functions and for safeguarding of investor's funds, and that it thus would be dif-
ficult for FCMs to exert control over such brokers. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at
41; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 49.
8 See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 41.
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specifically designed to enhance the ability of introducing brokers to
operate and to promote their relationships with other broker-dealers.
While the definition of broker-dealers under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) includes introducing brokers in the securities
industry,' and subjects them to the full range of regulatory requirements,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the individual ex-
changes have afforded special treatment to introducing brokers in several
areas. This section will outline and discuss those areas of the federal
securities laws containing special provisions for introducting brokers, in-
cluding net capital and reserve requirements, recordkeeping requirements,
the suitability doctrine, and the relative liabilities of introducing and clear-
ing brokers to customers under the Exchange Act.
A. Separate Net Capital Requirements for Introducing Brokers
The net capital regulations for broker-dealers' are intended, like the
CFTC's minimum financial requirements, to protect customer funds
through the establishment of liquidity standards.89 Nevertheless, the SEC
recognized at an early date that many smaller brokerage firms, whose
participation was vital to the operation of the securities industry, would
be unable to comply with these burdensome regulations.9 Even at the
time the SEC adopted the original net capital rule, the SEC explicitly
recognized the need for a lesser standard in the case of those brokers
who merely introduce, but do not carry, customer accounts.9
Accordingly, the SEC adopted a net capital rule which delineates five
separate categories of broker-dealers, each category with its own net
capital requirements, including one for introducing brokers. 2 Under the
rules, those broker-dealers involved in a general securities business must
15 U.S.C.A. § 78a-78 (West Supp. 1983).
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1982).
See, e.g., FERRALL, CAPITAL AND BOOKKEEPING RULES (1962); N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS
and T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS, Ch. 6 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as WOLFSON]; Wolfson and Guttman, TheNet Capital Rules for Brokers and
Dealers, 24 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1972).
" In re National Association of Securities Dealers, 12 S.E.C. 322, 327 (1942).
91 rd, 1,
The argument has been made that some minimum capital requirement should ex-
ist which will be applicable to all brokers and dealers who do business with the
public and which will, in effect, place a floor under financial responsibility. We
do not need to decide the merits of this argument. The Commission is not now
in a position to determine what fixed minimum capital should be prescribed without
running a grave risk of needlessly penalizing certain brokers and dealers who
could not meet the standard. A fixed minimum capital requirement which is ade-
quate for a firm whose business is conducted entirely on a cash basis and in small
volume might be inadequate for a firm which does a general type of business,
including the carrying of customer's margin accounts and the holding in safekeep-
ing of customers' cash and securities. Id.
" 17 C.F.R. S 240.15c3-1(a)(2) (1982).
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maintain a net capital of not less than $25,000."3 A net capital of only $5,000
is required, however, if the broker does not hold customers' funds or
securities, or owe money or securities to customers, and does not carry
customers' accounts, but merely introduces and forwards all transactions
and accounts of customers to another broker or dealer who carries such
accounts on a fully disclosed basis and performs one or more of several
enumerated functions. 4
Moreover, the SEC has adopted a relatively expansive view of the
role of introducing brokers, to enhance their ability to remain in business.
Although such brokers generally must refrain from clearing or carrying
customer accounts, they are not strictly limited to the simple referral of
such accounts to clearing brokers. Instead, the SEC has permitted in-
troducing brokers to engage in certain, albeit restricted, activities while
still allowing them to qualify for reduced net capital treatment. 6 The ex-
press purpose of this approach is to assure that these smaller firms have
a secure position in the securities industry. 7
The SEC policy to isolate introducing firms for preferential treatment
to protect their stability, is also reflected in the reserve and segregation
requirements, which, as noted, also have a counterpart in the commodities
industry." Adopted pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act
of 1970,11 the reserve requirement was designed to limit use by broker-
dealers of customers' funds and mandate physical possession or control
by broker-dealers of fully paid and excess margin securities. 0 Despite
the rigid requirements and detailed computations of the rule, however,
an express exemption is created for an introducing broker or dealer who
clears all transaction for customers on a fully disclosed basis with a clear-
ing broker or dealer, and who promptly transmits all customer funds and
securities to the clearing broker or dealer.1"'
" See id. In addition, regulations prohibit broker-dealers from having a ratio of ag-
gregate indebtedness to net capital of greater than 15:1. Aggregate indebtedness, like net
capital, is calculated according to a lengthy and complex formula. Id. § 240.15c3-1 (1982).
Broker-dealers may, however, elect to employ an alternative net capital competition, if they
maintain net capital equal to the greater of $100,000 or four percent of aggregate debit
items. Id. S 240.15c3-1(f) (1982).
Id. § 240.15c3-1(a)(2) (1982). Regulations, however, require introducing brokers, like
all broker-dealers, to maintain a specified amount of excess net capital under the early
warning requirements. Id. S 240.17a-11 (1982). The five permitted activities are introduc-
tion of customer accounts on a fully disclosed basis, participation in certain underwritings
if all funds are forwarded promptly to an escrow agent, participation in issuance of securities
if all funds are transmitted promptly, transactions with other introducing brokers, and trans-
actions on behalf of exchange members. Id.
95 Id. § 240.17a-11 (1982).
9 Id.
11 See Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 10304 (July 30, 1973).
98 17 C.F.R. S 240.15c3-3 (1982); see supra notes 13-15.
Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1653 (codified at 15 U.S.C. S 78(c)(3)).
10 See WOLFSON, supra note 90, at 8-15.




The SEC has employed the same rationale in exempting introducing
brokers from certain of the recordkeeping requirements of section 17(a)
of the Exchange Act.0 2 Rule 17a-5 expressly exempts introducing brokers
from the required provision of customer statements.11
3
Introducing brokers are also subject to less stringent and less fre-
quent financial reporting requirements. For example, introducing brokers
must file FOCUS reports only quarterly, rather than monthly, and may
file financial information on what is essentially a short form. 4 In this in-
stance as well, the SEC has fostered the growth of introducing brokers
by the nature of its regulatory requirements.
C. The Suitability Doctrine and Exchange Rules
The suitability doctrine in the securities industry requires a broker
to have a good faith belief that a particular recommendation is suitable
for a customer's investment needs and financial capacity. 5 Originating
in the ethical guidelines of the industry's self-regulatory organizations,
the rule now exists in various forms under SEC regulations and exchange
rules."6 The SEC's suitability rule is also similar to the "know your
customer" rule of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and to analogous
rules of other self-regulatory organizations."'
CFTC has exempted such brokers from reserve and segregation requirements. 48 Fed. Reg.
14933 (April 8, 1983). The significance of the SEC's exemptions, however, is the fact that
introducing brokers are exempted expressly, and have been for many years.
"1 17 C.F.R. S 240.15c3-3(k)(2}(ii) (1982). The regulation further provides that the clear-
ing broker or dealer who receives customer funds from an introducing broker must main-
tain and preserve the books and records according to the applicable regulations. Id.
103 Id. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(c) (1982). The rule applies:
except if the activities of such broker-dealer are limited to any one or combina-
tion of the following and are conducted in the manner prescribed herein:
(1) As introducing broker or dealer, the forwarding of all the transactions of
his customers to a clearing broker or dealer on a fully disclosed basis.
Again, while the CFTC has adopted a similar exemption for introducing brokers, the signifi-
cant point, is the SEC's express and longstanding practice in this same area.
I Id. S 240.17a-5(a)(iii) (1982).
"' See, e.g., id. % 240.15b10-3, 240.15c2 (1982). No analogous suitability rule exists under
the Commodity Exchange Act. See Avis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, [1980-82 Transfer Binder]
CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,379, at 25,830, n.4 (1982). In Avis v. Shearson Hayden Stone,
the court noted that the CFTC has never adopted any rule of suitability governing the
commodity broker-customer relationship. The court also stated that the Commission did
not adopt the reasoning of the administrative law judge in his decision below suggesting
that suitability principles are implicit in any provision of the Act. Id.; see also Myron v.
Hauser, 673 F.2d 994 (8th Cir. 1982); Jensen v. Shearson Hayden Stone, [1980-82 Transfer
Binder] CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,324 (1981); Sherry v. Diercks, [1980-82 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,221 (1981). The CFTC at one point proposed the adoption of
a suitability rule, but subsequently declined to do so. 42 Fed. Reg. 44742, 44743-75 (1977);
43 Fed. Reg. 31886, 31889 (1978).
" 17 C.F.R. §5 240.15b10-3, 240.15c2-5 (1982).
M New York Stock Exchange, Rule 405; see also American Stock Exchange, Rule 11
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In 1982, the NYSE amended its rules to delete from the "know your
customer" rule any reference to introducing brokers and to allow introduc-
ing and clearing brokers greater flexibility in allocating between
themselves obligations to customers. 18 The amendments permit and even
encourage introducing and clearing firms to structure their relationship
to delineate their respective liabilities and responsibilities.0 9
The SEC's initial release on the proposal supported the intent of the
NYSE amendments to foster the development of introducing firms. The
SEC release stated that the clarification of duties would help to encourage
carrying organizations to make their capital available to introducing
organizations that could not otherwise afford to be broker-dealers. " '
The SEC noted further that the rule was intended to enhance the
viability of carrying agreements to the mutual benefit of introducers, car-
riers and investors."' No suitability rule analogous to that imposed under
the securities law exists in the commodities industry.' Nevertheless, the
manner in which the securities regulatory authorities have revised the
suitability doctrine to enhance the introducing/clearing relationship is il-
lustrative of the authorities' support for introducing brokers.
D. Relative Liability of Introducing and Clearing
Brokers to Customers
In contrast to the commodities laws, in which a controlling person
provision was not added until 1982, the federal securities laws have long
contained this form of secondary liability."' This provision provides a good
and National Association of Securities Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, § 2. See
generally Mundeim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine,
1965 DUKE L.J. 445 (1965) (history, purposes, and extent of suitability doctrine); Lowenfels,
An Historical Overview of Suitability and "Know Your Customer" Concepts in the Securities
Field, ALI-ABA Broker-Dealer Regulation 333 (1980); Bines, Setting Investment Objectives:
The Suitability Doctrine, 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 276,418 (1975). See also, Report of the Speciat Study
of the Securities Markets, H.R. Doe. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, at 316 (1963).
In addition to liability under the suitability or "know your customer" rules themselves,
securities brokers also may face liability for unsuitable recommendations under rule 19b-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, and the "shingle" theory. See WOLFSON, supra note 90, at 2.08.
' See Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 18497 (February 19, 1982h Securities Exchange
Act Rel. 18229 (November 2, 1981). The amendments affected rules 382 and 405 of the NYSE.
I" See Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 18497 (February 19, 1982Y Securities Exchange
Act Rel. No. 18229, November 2, 1981). The amendments affected rules 382 and 405 of the
NYSE.
I,0 Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 18229 (November 2, 1982).
1 Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 18497 (February 19, 1982).
1,2 See, e.g., Hoetger & Co. v. Asencio & Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
558 F. Supp. 1361, 1364 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Avis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. [1980-82
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,379 at 25,830, n.4 (1982).
113 See Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. S 77o; Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
5 20(a), 15 U.S.C. S 78a. Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 contain controlling person provisions that state that if a relationship of control is
present between an agent and principal, the controlling person can be held liable to the
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faith defense to the imposition of liability upon a controlling person for
a controlled person's conduct."' If the requisite relationship of control is
present, the availability of this defense largely prevents application of
a strict liability standard for the conduct of an agent or employee.
1 1 5
Securities broker-dealers have not been subject to the same type of ab-
solute liability imposed upon FCMs for the actions of introducing brokers."8
Moreover, similar to the situation under the commodities laws, other
forms of secondary liability under the federal securities laws require some
knowing involvement or participation in an introducing broker's miscon-
duct before liability of a clearing broker may be found. A showing of
scienter on the part of the clearing broker is necessary for imposition
of liability and some degree of knowing assistance is necessary before
aider and abettor liability can attach.17 As a result, in most instances,
a clearing broker may be held liable for an introducing broker's miscon-
duct only on the basis of actual involvement, or on an inability to
demonstrate good faith.
This situation is a direct result of the fact that introducing brokers
same extent as the controlled person, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and
did not induce directly or indirectly the acts of the controlled person. See Securities Act
of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. S 77o; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S 20(a), 15 U.S.C. S 78a;
see e.g., Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 80 (1981); Comment, A Comparison of Control Person Liability and
Respondeat Superior: Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 CAL. W.L. REV. 152
(1979); Reininger, Exclusive or Concurrent-the Role of Control and Respondeat Superior in
the Imposition of Vicarious Liability on Broker-Dealers, 9 SEC. REG. L. REV. 226 (1981); Com-
ment, Rule 10b-5 and Vicarious Liability Based on Respondeat Superior, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
1513 (1981).
Nevertheless, considerable confusion in the securities industry has existed as to whether
the controlling person provisions completely supplant, or merely supplement, common-law
respondeat superior liability. Compare Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980) with Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975) and Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982). See also Brodsky, Controlling Person Liability-a
Conflict, 186 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1981).
The Futures Trading Act of 1982, however, amended the Commodity Exchange Act
to include a controlling person provision similar to that set out under the securities laws.
7 U.S.C.A. S 13c (West Supp. 1983); CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 27. The Conference
REPORT, supra note 2, at 47-48. The amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act was made
in the Futures Trading Act of 1982 and was patterned to a great extent upon the com-
parable provisions in the securities laws. See 7 U.S.C.A. S 13c(b) (West Supp. 1983).
The amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act was made in the Futures Trading
Act of 1982 and was patterned to a great extent upon the comparable provisions in the
securities laws. See 7 U.S.C.A. S 13c(b) (West Supp. 1983).
14 See infra note 116 (cases cited).
11 Id.
See, e.g., Faturik v. Woodmere Securities, 431 F. Supp. 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Hirsch
v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); Cannizzaro v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc.,
81 F.R.D. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Edwards & Hanley v. Wells Fargo, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,916 (2d Cir. 1979).
117 Id.
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must register with the SEC and comply with its regulatory requirements.
Therefore, the SEC may hold these brokers directly liable for their own
misconduct. Yet the SEC has taken an active role in assuring the ability
of introducing firms to function and in promoting the introducing/clearing
firm relationship. The SEC has reduced regulatory requirements for in-
troducing brokers and has allowed them broad flexibility in structuring
their relationships with customers and other broker-dealers. With the adop-
tion of statutory provisions on introducing brokers and controlling per-
sons under the Commodity Exchange Act as well, the CFTC will be in
a position to foster the development of a similar regulatory scheme.
V. CFTC REGULATIONS GOVERNING INTRODUCING BROKERS
On April 6, 1983, the CFTC published in the Federal Register the
CFTC's proposed rules for regulation of introducing brokers and other
newly established categories of registrants.'18 The proposal, intended to
incorporate introducing brokers into the regulatory scheme, set out re-
quirements for introducing broker registration, minimum financial stan-
dards, recordkeeping and reporting requirements and related matters,
representing extensive changes in CFTC regulations. The proposal also
set out detailed procedural requirements for registration and computa-
tion of net capital."'
During an extensive comment period, in which over 100 letters of com-
ment were received by the CFTC, industry members generally expressed
support for the proposal, although many advocated substantial changes
that intended to liberalize the introducing broker requirements.2 ' As a
result, the final regulations-adopted by the CFTC on July 29,
1983- differed in several significant respects from the original proposal. 2'
This section of the article will analyze the proposed and final regulations,
48 Fed. Reg. 14933 (April 6, 1983).
119 Id. The release also covers registration and regulatory requirements for associated
persons of introducing brokers, as well as associated persons of commodity trading advisors
and commodity pool operators. Previously, the employees of these latter two categories
were not required to be registered with the CFTC in any capacity. The Futures Trading
Act of 1982 also provided for their registration. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 90, at 1143.
The CFTC's release covered 40 pages in the Federal Register, and set out not only the
regulatory requirements for new categories of registrants, but the detailed procedures for
registration, included required forms and fees.
On March 22, 1983, the CFTC published in the Federal Register a notice that, until
such time as the CFTC is prepared to accept registration applications from new categories
of registrants, the CFTC would abide by pre-existing requirements, despite the fact that
the statutory mandate would have taken effect. 48 Fed. Reg. 11926 (March 22, 1983).
10 48 Fed. Reg. 35248 (August 3, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. S 1.3(mm)).
1 Id. The final regulations were adopted by a CFTC release issued on July 29, 1983,
but were not made effective until their publication in the Federal Register on August 3,
1983. The Federal Register release covered close to 60 pages, setting out in detail not only
the nature and purpose of the final regulations, but also the CFTC's reasons for deviating
from the original proposals and its responses to many of the comment letters as well.
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and will identify those areas in which such changes were made as well
as those in which further modifications may be necessary.
A. Registration Requirements for Introducing Brokers
The CFTC's proposed regulations would have required registration
as an introducing broker of any person or entity who, directly or indirectly,
is compensated either on a per-trade basis, or for the referral of customers
to an FCM.'" This provision clearly would have required registration of
those formerly acting as designated agents. By proposing to define in-
troducing broker registration in terms of the nature of the fee received,
however, rather than the nature of the business engaged in, the CFTC
extended the scope of the introducing broker category beyond that which
was included in the 1982 amendments to the CEA.'
As noted, the CEA requires only that persons engaged in the solicita-
tion or acceptance of customer orders register as introducing brokers.2
In the securities business, a person referring customers to a broker-dealer
for a fee, as a practical matter, would be required to register with the
SEC in some capacity." The CFTC's proposal, however, would have re-
quired introducing broker registration on the part of many commodity
trading advisors (CTAs), securities broker-dealers and firms or individuals
not engaged in a futures business but who occasionally refer a customer
to an FCM.11 Because each of these individuals or entities are not engaged
primarily in the solicitation or acceptance of customer orders as introduc-
ing brokers, but simply refer such orders to an FCM as an incident to
their principal business, they would not appear to be included within the
definition of introducing broker contemplated by Congress.
The CFTC received numerous comment letters requesting that a nar-
rower definition of introducing broker be adopted for purposes of registra-
tion and, in particular, that an exemption from such registration be
included for commodity trading advisors and those brokers referring
orders on an occasional basis.m In adopting the final regulations, therefore,
the CFTC eliminated its proposed reliance on the form and manner of
introducing broker compensation as the principle determinant of the
registration requirement." Instead, the regulations expressly exclude from
the definition of introducing broker any CTA who either manages discre-
48 Fed. Reg. 14933, 19435 (April 6, 1983).
12 Id.
12 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1983).
IM WOLFSON, supra note 89, at 1.06.
12 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35250-53 (August 3, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. S 1.3(mm)).
127 Id.
1 Id. at 35251. Nevertheless, with the exception of CTA's, or other individuals or en-
tities already subject to CFTC registration, any person receiving compensation for introducing
accounts to an FCM will be subject to the requirement of introducing broker registration.
Thus, the presence of compensation remains the principal determinant of introducing broker
registration.
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tionary accounts or who is not compensated on a per-trade basis.'" In
addition, the definition expressly excludes those persons soliciting or ac-
cepting customer orders solely in a clerical capacity, or who are not com-
pensated, directly or indirectly, for their activities as an introducing
broker.1"
Conversely, the regulations establish an exemption for introducing
brokers from CTA registration. 3 ' Although the CEA includes an express
exemption for futures commissions merchants from CTA registration,'32
the CFTC originally proposed that this same exemption not be extended
to introducing brokers." As a result, the proposed regulations would have
subjected introducing brokers rendering advice to customers to registra-
tion as commodity trading advisors even if such advice was solely incidental
to the conduct of their business."u The CFTC had proposed to exempt
from such registration those introducing brokers who neither directed
customers' accounts nor guided customers' accounts by means of a
systematic program."3 5 The manner in which direct or guide would have
been defined in this context was not clear, however. Moreover, the proposal
left uncertain the extent to which the regulations would have subjected
an introducing broker to commodity trading advisor registration if its
employees, whom the regulations require to register as associated
persons,"' guided or managed customer accounts.
As a result of these concerns, which were raised with the CFTC dur-
ing the comment period, the CFTC, adopted final regulations that exempt
introducing brokers from CTA registration if their advisory activities are
solely in connection with their business as introducing brokers.' Introduc-
ing brokers will be subject to a registration exemption similar to that
provided for associated persons, but more limited than that available to
FCMs.'1 This registration exemption will allow introducing brokers to
provide incidental advice to their customers without the added burden
11 Id. In addition, FCMs, floor brokers and associated persons are similarly excluded
from the definition of introducing broker. Id. The definition also excludes any commodity
pool operator solely engaged in the operation of commodity pools. Id.
13 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35251 (August 3, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. S 1.3(mm)).
The CFTC noted that "indirect" compensation could include such things as provision of
research services. The CFTC's release also sets out procedures and requirements for registra-
tion of "equity raisers" or others receiving a fee or "split" commissions for referrals. 48
Fed. Reg. 35248, 35251, 35253 (August 3, 1983).
131 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35252 (August 3, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. S 4.14(a)(6)).
1 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1) (West Supp. 1983). The definitional section of the CEA contains
the exemption that excludes FCMs from the meaning of commodity trading advisor.
13 48 Fed. Reg. 14933, 14936 (April 6, 1983).
1 Id. The "solely incidental" language is derived from S 2(a)(1) of the Act, and is the
basis for the exemption from CTA registration for futures commission merchants and cer-
tain other entities or individuals. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1) (West Supp. 1983).
13 48 Fed. Reg..14933, 14935 (April 6, 1983).
13 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35253 (August 3, 1983). See infra notes 145-49 and accompany-
ing text.
137 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35252 (August 3, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. S 4.14(a)(3)).
1 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35252 (August 3, 1983). FCMs, as noted, are exempt from CTA
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and expense of CTA registration. Indeed, given the substantial filings and
disclosures required of introducing brokers, the additional requirements
of CTA registration would do little to enhance customer protection.
In addition, the proposed regulations were silent about the necessity
for foreign brokers introducing accounts to futures commission merchants
to register as introducing brokers. As noted above, current CFTC regula-
tions allow foreign brokers to operate in the absence of registration, but
require clearing futures commission merchants to act as their agents for
purposes of regulatory compliance and CFTC notifications.'39 Under the
final regulations, this requirement has been specifically amended to state
that introducing brokers, as well as FCMs, may act as the agents of foreign
brokers for whom they introduce accounts."4 As a result, foreign brokers
still will not be subject to registration as introducing brokers, although
introducing brokers dealing with such foreign brokers will be required
by regulation to assume additional responsibilities.
If an entity or individual is required to register as an introducing
broker, the regulations restrict their activities to the solicitation, accep-
tance and referral of customer orders.' Introducing brokers are also pro-
hibited from maintaining back office operations, although these brokers
will be permitted to engage in trading for proprietary or house accounts
and to solicit orders for unregulated futures transactions. "' In addition,
registration so long as their advisory activities are solely indicental to their business at
FCMs. See supra note 142. The CFTC has stated that the applicability of the "solely in-
cidental" standard cannot be determined according to any numerical criteria, but only through
evaluation of "the context of the business concerned and the factual situation in which the
services are rendered." CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 76-1, [1975-77 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,135 (February 26,1976). Thus, an FCM publishing periodic advice may
be exempt from CTA registration.
In contrast, an associated person of an FCM forwarding written recommendations or
advice to existing or prospective customers has been held subject to CTA registration,
since such activities are deemed by the CFTC not to be solely in connection with the
associated person's business. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 75-6, [1975-77 Transfer Binder]
Com . FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,093 (August 11, 1975). Introducing brokers, as noted, will be
subject to this narrower standard.
"' See supra notes 33-34.
"' 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35261 (August 3, 1983); 17 C.F.R. S 15.05 (1982).
48 Fed. Reg. 14933, 14934 (April 6, 1983). In adopting the final regulations, the CFTC
noted that customers should, in most instances, transmit funds directly to the FCM carry-
ing the account. 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35269 (August 3, 1983). Nevertheless, the CFTC stated
that an introducing broker will not be prohibited from receiving customer funds, payable
to the FCM, and depositing it in account, if certain prescribed conditions are met. Id. at 35270.
"I Id. at 35267. See also 48 Fed. Reg. 14933, 14934 (April 6, 1983). "Back office" opera-
tions include processing of trades, segregation of funds and other recordkeeping. Because
introducing brokers will not be carrying customer funds or processing orders, but simply
transmitting these to a registered firm, introducing brokers will not maintain "back office"
operations. The final regulations, while permitting introducing brokers to engage in trading
for proprietary accounts, prohibit such trading in foreign futures. 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35267
(August 3, 1983).
Introducing brokers, by definition, also are prohibited from carrying any customer,
as well as proprietary accounts. 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35267 (August 3, 1983). Introducing
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the CFTC had proposed to prohibit the solicitation of orders for options
transactions by introducing brokers, but has now determined to allow such
solicitations provided that the introducing broker is a member of a self-
regulatory organization that regulates its options activities, is a member
of a contract market approved for the regulation of options trading by
its members, or has entered into a guarantee agreement with an FCM."'
The partners, officers, employees or agents of an introducing broker,
like those of a futures commission merchant, will be required to register
with the CFTC as associated persons if they are engaged in the solicita-
tion or acceptance of customer funds, other than in a clerical capacity or
in the supervision of persons so engaged.14 In addition, the sponsorship
and fingerprinting requirements will be equally applicable to such
associated persons and their employers. 4 ' Previously, as noted, associa-
tions with more than one futures commission merchant by an associated
person were prohibited.14 This prohibition has been maintained and, in
addition, associated persons may not, under the new regulations, associate
with one FCM and one introducing broker.4 ' The regulations also extend
the duty of supervision imposed on FCMs to introducing brokers as well.'48
B. Minimum Financial Requirements
The minimum financial or net capital regulations, as set out above,
constituted the single most significant barrier to small firm registration
under the Commodity Exchange Act.' For this reason, in amending the
CEA to include introducing broker registration, the conference commit-
tee expressed an intent that the small firm introducing broker remain
economically viable." The minimum financial requirements originally pro-
brokers, however, may accept funds in the name of the carrying FCM, subject to certain
prescribed conditions. Id. at 35269-70.
1I Id. at 35272 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. S 33.3). The CFTC's earlier position was
that, because its options program has been implemented on a pilot basis only, the program
must remain limited until such time as its viability can be demonstrated. Id; see also, Markham
and Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options-Two Regulatory Approaches and Their Conflicts,
47 ALB. L. REv. 741 (1983); 48 Fed. Reg. 14933, 14934 (April 6, 1983).
" 48 Fed. Reg. 35428, 35253 (August 3, 1983).
14 Id. This regulation requires introducing brokers to perform background checks on
their associated persons and to verify, among other things, their prior employment history.
17 C.F.R. S 3.12 (1982).
,41 See supra note 23.
14 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35255 (August 3, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. S 3.12(f)).
Associated persons, however, may become associated with more than one CTA or com-
modity pool operator. Id. The regulations permit a one time "transfer" of registered status
for associated persons formerly employed by unregistered agents. 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35260
(August 3, 1983). Such associated persons may become affiliated with an FCM or introduc-
ing broker without re-registration.
48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35274 (August 3, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. S 166.3).
149 See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
11o CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 41.
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posed by the CFTC for introducing brokers, however, while less than those
imposed upon FCMs, were substantial and would have made business dif-
ficult for some smaller introducing brokers. The final regulations,
therefore, establish minimum financial requirements for introducing
brokers less than those requirements originally proposed, and set out an
alternative method of compliance.15'
The CFTC's proposal would have required introducing brokers to main-
tain a net capital of $50,000 or, if the broker is a member of the National
Futures Association, $25,000."' Moreover, because the proposal would have
required that introducing brokers maintain 150 percent of this net capital
figure at all times, to comply with the CFTC's early warning regulations
introducing brokers would have had to meet minimum financial require-
ments of $37,500 or $75,000.11 In contrast, the SEC imposes a net capital
requirement of only $5,000 upon introducing brokers operating in the
securities industry, although these brokers may be subject to greater re-
quirements in some instances."
Under the final regulations, however, introducing brokers will be re-
quired to maintain net capital of $20,000 and will not be required to submit
monthly financial reports if their capital falls below the early warning
,' 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35261-70 (August 3, 1983).
48 Fed. Reg. 14933, 14942 (April 6, 1983). See 7 U.S.C.A. S 21 (West Supp. 1983);
see also 17 C.F.R. § 170.1-.12 (1982). The National Futures Association (NFA) is registered
as a futures association under § 17 of the CEA which contains provisions for regulation
and oversight of such organizations by the CFTC. The NFA took four years to develop,
and represents an attempt by the commodities industry to establish a nationwide self-
regulatory body.
Congress amended the CEA during the 1978 reauthorization to permit compulsory
membership, a requirement that the Department of Justice had objected to as anti-
competitive. Pub. L. No. 95405, 92 Stat. 864. See generally NFA, Application to the CFTC
For Registration Under Section 17 of the CEA (March 16, 1981); S. REP. No. 850,95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 30-31 (1978); 1982 Senate Hearings, supra, note 2, at 322. The CFTC, however, adopted
the compulsory membership rule, effective August 8, 1983, and this rule requires all FCMs
to become NFA members. 48 Fed. Reg. 26304 (June 7, 1983). Moreover, because NFA by-
laws prohibit members from doing business with non-members, introducing brokers will
in effect be subject to the same requirement. 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35261 (August 3, 1983).
"5 48 Fed. Reg. 14933, 14958-59 (April 6, 1983). The early warning requirements assure
that futures commission merchants maintain more than the required amount of net capital
at all times. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.12 (1982).
17 C.F.R. S 240.15c3-1(a)(2) (1982). Regulations subject securities introducing brokers,
like broker-dealers and futures commission merchants, to "early warning" requirements
that mandate that securities introducing brokers maintain a specified amount of excess
net capital. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-11 (1982). This excess amount is stated in terms of a percent-
age of net capital or of aggregate indebtedness, if the alternative net capital method is elected.
In its original proposal, the CFTC noted that securities introducing brokers are sub-
ject not to a $5,000 minimum financial requirement, but actually to the greater of $5,000
or 6-2/3% of aggregate indebtedness. 48 Fed. Reg. 14933, 14934, n.3 (April 6, 1983). This,
however, is not the case. The 6-2/3% computation applies only to subsidiaries of registered
broker-dealers who elect not to follow the alternative net capital computation. 17 C.F.R.
S 240.15c3-1(f}(2) (1982).
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level.155 Introducing brokers will be required to give notice only in those
instances in which their net capital falls below the required levels. 56 As
a result, rather than being required to maintain an actual net capital of
$37,500, introducing brokers will be subject to the $20,000 requirement
only.
1 57
Further, the CFTC has adopted a regulation, which was not contained
in the original proposal, that will allow an introducing broker to satisfy
the minimum financial requirments by entering into a guarantee agree-
ment with a clearing FCM.'58 This agreement, the content of which has
been specified by the CFTC as a supplement to form 1-FR, provides that
the FCM will guarantee performance by the introducing broker of all its
obligations under the CEA and CFTC regulations. '59 By entering into such
an agreement, an introducing broker can exempt itself from the minimum
financial requirements and may engage in options transactions." °
Nevertheless, while the final regulations constitute a relaxation of
the net capital obligations proposed for introducing brokers, the alter-
native method of compliance may not be viable for many introducing
brokers. Thus, while introducing brokers may avoid the minimum financial
requirements entirely by entering into a guarantee agreement, whether
FCMs generally will be willing to do so is not clear. The regulations re-
quire a guarantee by the FCM of all the introducing broker's operations
including solicitations and other actions over which the FCM will have
little or no control. 6' As a result, the alternative requirement apparently
will benefit only those introducing brokers associated closely enough with
a clearing futures commission merchant to allow the latter to guarantee
fully all the operations of the former. 6 ' Because many futures commission
merchants may be unwilling to do so, the provision may be of limited ef-
fectiveness for many introducing brokers.
C. Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements
The regulations require an introducing broker to prepare and keep
155 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35261-62 (August 3, 1983).
I" Id. at 35269.
5I Id. at 35261. Securities broker-dealers registered with the SEC, and with the CFTC
as introducing brokers, will be subject to a net capital requirement of $25,000, the amount
established for broker-dealers engaged in a general securities business. Broker-dealers
registered with the SEC as introducing brokers, subject to the SEC's reduced net capital
requirement of $5,000, will be required to maintain net capital of $20,000 if also registered
with the CFTC as an introducing broker.
15 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35264-66 (August 3, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. S 1.17(a(2)(ii)).
159 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35261 (August 3, 1983). The release and regulations also set
out in detail the required form and procedures for such guarantee agreements.
160 See id.; see also supra note 143.
161 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35261 (August 3, 1983).
," Id. A number of futures commission merchants, however, do have such close business
relationships with their introducing brokers and will likely be willing to guarantee their
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current the same type of financial records which an FCM must maintain.'3
The CFTC had proposed to require that introducing firms also file the
same financial statement required of futures commission merchants, thus
imposing substantial additional burdens upon introducing brokers.1 64 In
contrast, as noted, SEC regulations require introducing brokers in the
securities industry to file only an abbreviated financial statement, and
less frequently than broker-dealers generally.
165
The CFTC modified certain of these requirements in adopting the final
regulations. Introducing brokers will be required to file financial reports,
certified by an independent public accountant, with their applications for
registration and annually thereafter to satisfy requirements equally ap-
plicable to futures commission merchants.16 In addition, introducing
brokers will be required to submit FOM filed quarterly financial reports,
which need not be certified. 7 If, however, the introducing broker's
designated self-regulatory organization adopts regulations, approved by
the CFTC, which allow the filing of semiannual reports, quarterly filings
need not be made."8 Further, in filing the required financial reports, in-
troducing brokers will be permitted to file a simplified form 1-FR, the
financial reporting form for futures commission merchants. 9 Moreover,
introducing brokers operating pursuant to a guarantee agreement will
not be required to file any financial reports, and special provisions have
been made for firms also registered as broker-dealers with the SEC, and
for country grain elevators. 7 °
operations: "And we feel that we are a firm [the FCM] for that agency [the introducing
broker]". Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 219 (statement of Howard A. Stottler).
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.10, 1.12, 1.16, 1.17 (1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 14933, 14957-63 (April 6,
1983). The regulations require introducing brokers, like futures commission merchants, to
include in their reports detailed statements of financial condition and transactions affect-
ing that condition. See 48 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14952 (April 6, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.18).
1" 48 Fed. Reg. 14933, 14949-52 (April 6, 1983). The regulations set out the require-
ment of certification of financial reports by an independent public accountant. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.16 (1982). The regulations require that accountants meet certain qualifications and prepare
reports in a specific form and manner. Id.
1 See supra note 105.
48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35263 (August 3, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 1.10(a)).
48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35263 (August 3, 1983) (to be codifed at 17 C.F.R. 5 1.10(b)(1)).
48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35263 (August 3, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. SS 1.10(b)(3),
1.52). In addition, either the NFA or a contract market of which the introducing broker
is a member may serve as its designated self-regulatory organization.
... 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35262 (August 3, 1983). The specific alterations that will be made
to form 1-FR for filings by introducing brokers is not clear yet. The CFTC indicated in
its release adopting the regulations that the CFTC simply will include separate instruc-
tions for introducing brokers and highlight those portions of the form which are inapplicable
to an introducing broker's operations. Id.
Id. at 35249, 35262-63. Introducing brokers registered as broker-dealers with the SEC
may file a copy of their FOCUS Report, Part II or Part IIA, and an introducing broker
which is also a country grain elevator may file a report submitted pursuant to a Uniform
Grain Storage Agreement.
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The regulations also require introducing brokers, as well as futures
commission merchants, to prepare a time-stamped record of each customer
order and a daily journal of all customer trades."n Because the regula-
tions do not permit introducing brokers to carry customer accounts, in-
troducing brokers will not be required to prepare detailed financial and
contract ledgers of all transactions nor to supply confirmation, monthly
and purchase and sale statements to customers, since the futures com-
mission merchant will remain liable for these requirements."2
VI. Conclusion
Introducing brokers, in one form or another and under numerous
labels, have long been a significant part of the futures industry serving
to enhance customer access to exchanges as well as market liquidity. The
need for these brokers today, however, in a time of rapid expansion in
trading volume, is perhaps even more compelling than in the past. Yet
at the same time, a regulatory structure governing the activities of in-
troducing brokers is essential to the adequate protection of the many
customers with whom they do business. The formidable task now facing
the industry and the CFTC, therefore, is the achievement of a delicate
balance that will assure customer protection while allowing introducing
firms to function effectively.
" 48 Fed. Reg. 14933, 14953 (April 6, 1983); 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(b) (1982). The time-stamping
and recordkeeping requirements are intended to allow reconstruction of an "audit trail"
in order to determine the existence of liability in instances of customer complaints.
12 48 Fed. Reg. 14933, 14953 (April 6, 1983); 17 C.F.R. 5 1.33, 1.46 (1982). The final regula-
tions add a requirement that monthly confirmation and purchase and sale statements pro-
vided to customers indicate that the account for which the statements are provided was
introduced to the FCM by an introducing broker. 48 Fed. Reg. 35248, 35272 (August 3,
1983). In addition, the regulations have been amended to require either an FCM or in-
troducing broker to provide a Risk Disclosure Statement to commodity futuris customers.
Id. at 35273 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. S 1.55). The CFTC has stated, however, that it
is primarily the responsibility of the introducing broker to provide a Risk Disclosure State-
ment. 48 Fed. Reg. 35428, 35273 (August 3, 1983).
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